By Prachi Tailor
PM Modi on his visit to Russia in May 2024 Source: The Hindu
Nearly two and a half years ago, New Delhi found itself grappling with a seismic shift in geopolitical dynamics in the wake of Russia’s incursion into Ukrainian sovereignty. Today, as the conflict has evolved, numerous major powers have unequivocally aligned themselves with Ukraine’s cause, providing not only diplomatic backing but also substantial military and economic aid to strengthen its defence capabilities. However, India, a key player in the Indo-Pacific region, has maintained an infamously nuanced position, refraining from explicit criticism of Moscow.
The spectre of potential Chinese aggression along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) looms large in New Delhi’s foreign policy calculus, compelling it to preserve its longstanding alliance with Russia – a relationship that has historically served as a counterbalance to regional threats. To unravel the intricacies of India’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, Professor Harsh V. Pant, Professor of International Relations at King’s College London, sat down with The Colloquium to explore India’s navigation of delicate balancing act between its democratic values and realpolitik imperatives.
There has always been a consistently strong and positive relationship between India and Russia. What factors have historically contributed to the nature of this relationship?
Historically, a number of factors have contributed. One, of course, is that during the Cold War, India was left at the margins of the global politics of the West. They found Pakistan a more important partner than India. Pakistan was part of all these military alliances, such as SEATO and Cento. India’s non-alignment was seen as more of a negative and anti-western posturing. So, the West was not very happy. India also took positions on issues, for example, on the nuclear question which defied the Western position. So, the Western countries put sanctions on India. As a result, for high-end and defence technology, India had to rely on the Soviet Union. Since then, a relationship has evolved with the Soviet Union, which continues to remain important to both sides.
There has been a dimension of India's historical relationship that evolved over the course of the Cold War. A certain defence dependency emerged. India was not buying weapons from anywhere else apart from Russia. So, by the time the Cold War ended, India was almost 80-85% dependent on Russian weaponry. That is a huge dependence which is difficult to get back from. That element has been a strong part of India’s engagement with Russia.
Also, many Indians viewed Russia as a partner that has stood by them in very difficult times. A historical memory is associated with Russia. Even at a time when Americans were coercing India, Russia was one country that was not only sharing technological and military goods, but also played an important part in balancing India’s position in the UN Security Council. So, I think all these factors make it very difficult for Russia to diverge in the post-Cold War period. As Indian and Russian foreign policies have evolved in the last few decades, I think there is a question about the India-Russia relationship continues to pose a lot of attention in the Russian capital and particularly post-Ukraine.
Indian policymakers believe that till the very last minute, they should be making an effort to ensure that Russia’s relationship with China does not become a relationship that is targeted against India.
One of the reasons India has been neutral is because preserving its friendship with Moscow will help to prevent deepening Russian ties with China. Is this a correct assumption that by taking this stance, New Delhi now stands in the way of Sino-Russian ties? And if yes, do you think that this strategy has been successful so far?
I don’t think that India can, on its own, manage the Russia-China relationship in a manner that dooms the possibility of the two coming together. We have seen, for example, that the two nations have continued to come together over the last few years, and in the post-Ukraine phase, of course, the ties have deepened. So, India alone can make this difference. However, what India wants to do is to keep this channel of communication open with Russia. India does not want Russia to feel that it has no partners at a time when the West is sanctioning them, and when the West is opposed to Russia. So, for India, it is very important that the line of communication remains open and it continues to have a dialogue with Russia.
In fact, Indian policymakers believe that till the very last minute, they should be making an effort to ensure that Russia’s relationship with China does not become a relationship that is targeted against India. From that perspective, it is natural for India to continue to invest in that relationship. Even if you believe that the Russia-China relationship has a logic of its own, which I believe it has, because they are both anti-Western orientation and therefore, they are in such a position on the global stage. I think India's position is slightly different. India is not assuming that, because of its outreach to Russia, it is going to have an impact on the relationship between Russia and China. What it certainly wants to do is to have this outreach so that eventually India can continue to have some semblance of a relationship with Russia, given its defence dependence and strategic requirement, etc.
Many Russians also feel that in order not to become a junior partner of China, they need a partner like India. So, that relationship with India gives Russia some space to manoeuvre vis-à-vis China. Otherwise, China is such a dominant player in the relationship that Russia would certainly become a junior partner. So, I think it serves both ends. Russia giving a message to China that we have other partners like India. For India, it is an attempt to keep that line open with Russia, because Russia shares so many of its interests and the dependence on Russia is still too high when it comes to defence. So, for India, it is a slightly interesting position, because in some ways, Russia is important to balancing China as well. India is currently the only country which needs both Russia and the West to counter China. It needs Russia in the short term, given that Indian and Chinese forces are facing each other along the border. There are around 60,000 forces on either side. India cannot afford that the Russians get up tomorrow and say we are not going to have a defence relationship with India. That is not sustainable for India. Therefore, in the short- to medium-term, even if India diversifies its defence supplies, even if India develops its own defence manufacturing base, it is not enough. India will continue to want to have a relationship with Russia that allows for the possibility to manage its defence.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry often describes the state of Arunachal Pradesh in terms that emphasize their deep historical and cultural connections, much like the rhetoric Russia employs regarding Ukraine. Considering this, do you believe India's stance on the Ukraine conflict might undermine its own position concerning its territorial disputes with China? Do you see a contradiction in India's diplomatic approach in these contexts?
The answer is yes and no. Of course, the India-China border tensions pre-date the Ukraine conflict. The Chinese have been targeting India, the border areas of Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim, long before the Ukraine conflict. There is no any misperception in India that not taking a categorical position on Ukraine is going to impact Chinese rivalry, because the Chinese have their own dream plan with India and most Indian policymakers seem aware of it.
What I think the challenge for Indian diplomacy is that India has always been very categorical about the need for the protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity, which the Chinese also have said in their own foreign policy position, and the Russians too. They believe that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the nation should not be compromised at any cost. When the West in the 1990s was propagating concepts like responsibility to protect, for example, when there are massive human rights violations or genocide in any particular country, the international community claimed a right to intervene. Now, the Indians, the Russians, and the Chinese have taken a different position, saying that this is something that can complicate matters. If sovereignty is the guiding principle of the post-Westphalian international order, then that should be protected. Therefore, for India, standing up for the normative value of sovereignty is very important. If you read the response to Ukraine, the only thing India has not done is categorically identify Russia as the aggressor. Other than that, India has said that territorial integrity and sovereignty should be the defining norms around which this conflict should be resolved and international law should prevail in UN Security Council. India has been taking a balanced approach to this issue. It does not want to antagonise Russia, but at the same time, wants to stand up for the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity; knowing full well, as you are articulating, that if this principle is challenged in one geography, it can be challenged in other geography in other actors. Therefore, uniformity across both borders should prevail. Therefore, the challenge has been, given India’s position – its interest in Russia and the challenge that it faces from China – both of these issues are important. You want to highlight the normative aspect of sovereignty being trampled upon, but you also want to ensure that the most important factor that is providing you all the logistics to confront China is also a friend of yours. So, it is a tough balancing act.
To be fair, I would say that India has been able to diplomatically convey to its partners in the West much better than many had anticipated when the conflict started. If you look at India’s relationship with the US, and with Europe today, despite Ukraine, they have not been impacted, which is a very important aspect of India’s engagement with these countries. India has been able to convey to these countries what Indian interests are and there has been a receptivity to that argument in Western capitals to a certain extent. Of course, when Mr. Modi went to Russia, eyebrows were raised and there are still questions being asked in Western media. However, if you look at the Western government’s responses over the last few years, since the conflict started, you would see that governments, while initially criticising India, they have been relatively mute. Whether it is Washington, London, Paris, Berlin, Brussels, they have not openly criticised India because they have also understood the logic of this argument that India wishes to manage China’s rise with some form of means with Russia and India has gradually underscored these normative arguments, that you are mentioning, sovereignty and territorial integrity in its response.
If you have a country like Pakistan or China that continues to challenge your sovereignty and territorial integrity, the first order of priority for any nation like India becomes that you must address those questions.
India seems to prioritises values like sovereignty and territorial integrity over other aspects of the liberal international order such as human rights and freedom of the press. From a foreign policy perspective, can you explain why India chooses not to focus on strengthening its nominal power?
India lives in a very difficult neighbourhood. For the European Union, after the Second World War, the idea had been to make geopolitics redundant – that normative ideas and values should guide European foreign policy. Now that Ukraine has come back to haunt Europe, these considerations are put to the test. Now, European Union wants an independent military and values sovereignty. What a nation focuses on in its foreign policy is a function of what kind of landscape it faces. India has always, throughout the Cold War and today, faced a very tough neighbourhood. If you have a country like Pakistan or China that continues to challenge your sovereignty and territorial integrity, the first order of priority for any nation like India becomes that you must address those questions.
Also, India has been facing many criticisms that many in India feel they do not deserve. During the Cold War and even thereafter, the West had no compunction in having partners like Pakistan and China. Both countries were very close partners of the West. However, both countries are not democratic or liberal. Whereas, India has always been, since independence, a liberal democracy – a multicultural, multi-ethnic liberal democracy. Yet, India found itself to be made pariah. Sanctions were put on India. India was seen as the problem country. India was seen as the other. India was seen as anti-West. So, the challenge in some ways for India has been to stand on its own terms in foreign policy when it did not have West as a partner.
Even post-Cold War, for a long time, the West had strong ties with China. It is only recently that we have seen the mood against China souring in the West. But from the Clinton administration onwards, we have seen how Chinese human rights problems were ignored because China was a big economy. Whereas India’s democracy was always critiqued. This is a point of contestation between India and the West. India may be a flawed democracy, but still, India was a democracy. Yet the West was courting China and pointing to India. So, I do think this is a function of historical and geographical issues that a country faces and how it responds to them. Therefore, India’s focus on sovereignty and territorial integrity being very vital for Indian interests is often reflected in its foreign policy aspirations.
A lot is driven by choices others are making.
Looking at the long-term perspective, what are the consequences of this stance in terms of its relationship with the EU or with the US and other countries?
I think a lot would depend on what happens to the war – how long the war lasts, and how Russia behaves and performs in the war. India is certainly hoping, as the Prime Minister said, that the war come to an end and Russia would come to a negotiated settlement with Ukraine. But that is what India can only hope for. Ultimately, hope is not a policy. Hope is something you wish to happen. If the war continues and escalates, then we will have problems. But I must also admit that, at this point, it is all very uncertain because, if you have Mr. Trump in office, even the West’s support would be in question. Mr. Trump and his vice-president candidate JD Vance have openly questioned the support for Ukraine, and said that they should be putting them on the negotiating table.
I personally do not think that this issue will have a major bearing on India’s relationship with the US or with Europe because the strategic logic of India’s relationship with the West is based on growing convergence with regards to China and the Indo-Pacific. If that convergence exists then there is no problem managing some of these issues. If the war continues then certainly a lot would depend on how the battlefield looks like and how the two in this conflict behave. So, a lot is driven by choices others are making.
In the event that the relationship between Russia and China evolves into a formal alliance, how would one navigate and adapt to the new geopolitical landscape?
This is the most important question for India. The question is not about Russia-Ukraine conflict at all. What is happening to the Russia-China relationship will be the most important aspect of India’s foreign policy landscape. If the relationship between Russia and China continues to evolve the way it has been evolving right now, then it is certainly going to change India’s national security and foreign policy landscape in a defined way. This is why India has always taken the American approach to make Russia the enemy, because Indians have argued that you cannot take on Russia and China at the same time. If you want to take on China, you need to have a relationship with Russia, which even if it is minimal. Today, by targeting China and Russia at the same time, there is a push to make Russia and China relationship much stronger than it potentially could have been. In some ways, this is very problematic for India. India will continue to see this as a development of great importance and will take countermeasures. As we have ascertained, for India, Russia has been a very important defence and strategic partner. If Russia falls as a junior partner to China, what happens to India’s defence relationship and technological relationship? What happens to India’s strategic priorities in regions like central Asia and caucuses? What happens to platforms like BRICS and SCO? This is why the trajectory of this relationship is so important for India to watch out for and develop countermeasures to manage the consequences.
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